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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 John Abel Urresti appeals from the district court’s appellate decision 
affirming the magistrate’s order denying Urresti’s motion to suppress. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Urresti with misdemeanor DUI.  (R., p. 6.)  He filed a 
motion to suppress evidence “on the ground that the seizure of Mr. Urresti was 
not conducted pursuant to a valid warrant and was not otherwise reasonable.”  
(R., pp. 13-14.)  The motion proceeded to a hearing.  (R., pp. 16-19; Tr.) 
 The magistrate found the following facts: Officers investigating a reported 
aggravated assault positioned their vehicles, some with their hazard lights 
flashing, to block off the investigation area from traffic.  (Tr., p. 64, L. 22 – p. 65, 
L. 17.)  Urresti attempted to drive his pickup through the police cordon, and an 
officer, concerned about the safety of officers conducting the investigation and 
knowing Urresti could not ultimately get through the area, ordered him to back 
up.  (Tr., p. 65, L. 18 – p. 66, L. 9; p. 66, L. 19 – p. 67, L. 11.)  When it appeared 
that Urresti was about to back into a parked car, an officer ordered him to stop, 
and the officer made contact with him.  (Tr., p. 66, Ls. 10-18.)  After the court 
made its factual findings it stated it must view the case “in a light most favorable 
to the state.”  (Tr., p. 67, Ls. 12-16.)  The magistrate then employed the following 
analysis:  
Had it been a situation where the defendant stopped 15 feet short 
of the whole area and was ordered to stop, I think—I think we 




probably be willing to agree that that—there was no reasonable 
articulable suspicion to do anything. 
 
But in this case, where the defendant did attempt to enter into a—a 
police investigation zone, and—and then, even though he was—he 
was stopped by an officer and backed up, I think the officer had—
had the right, and the—probably even the duty, to talk to him, make 
sure that he understood that he can’t do that type of thing. 
 
So, based on that, my conclusion that I’ll—I’ll deny the Motion to 
Exp—Suppress at this time. 
 
(Tr., p. 67, L. 17 – p. 68, L. 6.) 
 Urresti thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to 
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 30, 35-38.)  He appealed to 
the district court from the judgment.  (R., pp. 31, 41-43.)  
The district court stated that Urresti had raised two issues on appeal: 
“(1) the Magistrate Court erred in binding itself to viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the State; and (2) the seizure of a driver who is obeying traffic 
laws and obeys the commands of an officer directing traffic may not be seized 
and subjected to questioning.”  (R., p. 54.1)  As to the first issue, the district court 
concluded that although the magistrate’s comment about analyzing the case in a 
light favorable to the state was unclear, it was reasonable to interpret that 
comment as employing the correct legal standard that the officer’s actions had to 
be evaluated in light of the officer’s judgment and perception, and that 
reasonable mistakes of fact would not make the stop unreasonable.  (R., p. 56.)  
The district court also concluded that, if error, the error was harmless. 
(R., pp. 56-57.)  As to the second issue, the district court concluded:  “The stop 
                                            





was justified by the fact that the appellant was driving his vehicle past a police 
roadblock into a crime investigation zone. See I.C. § 18-705 (“Resisting and 
Obstructing Officers.”). The stop was also justified by the police community 
caretaking function.”  (R., p. 57.) 
Urresti timely appealed from the district court’s appellate decision. 








  Urresti states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the Magistrate Court erred in binding itself to 
viewing the evidence “in a light most favorable to the State” 
 
2. Whether the seizure of a driver who is obeying traffic laws 
and obeys the commands of an officer directing traffic may 
be seized and subjected to questioning. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5 (underlining omitted, punctuation original).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Does Urresti’s challenge to the magistrate’s “light most favorable” 
comment fail because Urresti has not challenged the district court’s conclusion 
that any error was harmless? 
 
2. Has Urresti failed to show any error on the merits of the district court’s 











Urresti’s Challenge To The Magistrate’s “Light Most Favorable” Comment Fails 
Because Urresti Has Not Challenged The District Court’s Conclusion That Any 
Error Was Harmless 
 
 “‘Where a lower court makes a ruling based on two alternative grounds 
and only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the appellate court must 
affirm on the uncontested basis.’”  Rich v. State, 159 Idaho 553, 555, 364 P.3d 
254, 256 (2015) (quoting State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517–18, 164 P.3d 
790, 797–98 (2007)).  “[T]his Court does not review the decision of the 
magistrate court. Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the 
decisions of the district court.”  Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 859, 303 P.3d 
214, 218 (2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
 The district court denied Urresti’s appellate claim that the magistrate’s 
“light most favorable” comment showed it employed an incorrect legal standard 
on two bases: on the merits and because any error was harmless.  (R., pp. 55-
57.)  The district court concluded that any error was harmless at least in part 
because the facts were generally not contradicted.  (See, e.g., R., p. 57 n.3.)  
Urresti does not challenge the district court’s determination that any error was 
harmless.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)  Therefore, the district court’s decision 












   The district court applied the relevant law to the facts found by the 
magistrate and concluded officers did not violate Urresti’s Fourth Amendment 
rights because an investigative detention was justified by reasonable suspicion 
that Urresti had tried to violate a controlled perimeter at a police investigation site 
and was also justified by the officers’ community caretaking function.  (R., pp. 57-
58.)  Specifically, after Urresti attempted to drive through a police blockade and 
almost struck multiple vehicles, the stop was justified by the officer’s desire to 
“ascertain why [Urresti] was driving past a police roadblock into a crime 
investigation scene,” “inform [Urresti] about the investigation,” “ascertain whether 
he needed to direct [Urresti] to where he was trying to go,” protect “officer safety,” 
and prevent “possible property damage.”  (R., pp. 57-58.)  
On appeal Urresti argues he was subjected to an illegal police roadblock 
and that once he complied with the initial command to back up any grounds for 
detaining him “dissipated.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.)  These arguments lack 
merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s 
decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 




appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  Id. 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  State v. Colvin, 
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 
C. Urresti Has Shown No Error In The District Court’s Decision On Appeal 
 
The district court applied the correct legal standard and affirmed the 
magistrate’s order denying suppression.  (R., pp. 50-60 (copy attached as an 
appendix to this brief).)  The state adopts the district court’s analysis as its 
argument on appeal. 
Urresti first argues that the police employed an unconstitutional roadblock, 
citing State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988).  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 7-8.)  The issue addressed in Henderson was “whether a police 
roadblock designed to detect and deter drunk driving is constitutionally 
permissible where the police have failed to obtain a judicial warrant, have no 
probable cause to believe the automobile driver is engaged in criminal 
wrongdoing, and lack legislative authority to establish a roadblock.”  Henderson, 
114 Idaho at 293, 756 P.2d at 1057 (emphasis added).  The roadblock in this 
case was not designed to compel contact between police and motorists, but was 




comply with the implicit command to stay out of the police cordon that caused the 
police to interact with him at all.  Henderson does not stand for the proposition 
that police must allow motorists to drive through their crime scene cordon, or that 
they must constitutionally ignore those who try. 
  Urresti next argues that his compliance with the initial commands to stop 
and back up “dissipated” any grounds to seize him.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  That 
officers successfully prevented Urresti from penetrating the police cordon did not 
“dissipate” their suspicion that he had attempted to do so.  Likewise, the fact that 
he nearly hit a parked car while trying to back out only heightened, rather than 
“dissipated,” concern that Urresti might need information or directions and might 
also pose a threat of property damage as he tried to negotiate the untenable 
position in which he had placed himself in relation to the other cars. 
Urresti has failed to show error.  The district court correctly concluded that 
contacting Urresti by having him roll down his window after Urresti had tried to 
penetrate a police cordon of a potential crime scene and had almost hit other 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the appellate decision 
of the district court. 
 DATED this 18th day of August, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR-MD-2015-0000054 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. OPINION ON APPEAL 
JOHN A. URRESTI, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: KYLE SCHOU 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: ANDREA CARROLL 
John A. Urresti appeals from the decision of the magistrate denying his motion to 
suppress. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On or about December 31, 2014, the appellant, Mr. Urresti, was arrested for and 
charged with Driving Under the Influence (Second). He moved to suppress evidence. 
The motion was denied following hearing. The appellant entered a guilty plea, 
conditioned on his ability to appeal the magistrate's decision concerning his motion to 
suppress. 
The evidence submitted at the hearing came from Corporal Paul Grabe, a Boise 
police officer. Corporal Grabe said he had been with the Boise Police Department for 
approximately 22 years. March 16, 2015, Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript, at 12. 
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He was on duty the evening of December 31, 2014, New Year's Eve. See id. at 13. He 
explained that at about 10:30 p.m., "myself and other officers had responded to a tone 
alert, which is where they [dispatch) ask all the officers in close-by area to respond. And 
it was an aggravated assault that was reported, so we were all over there calming that 
down. And the - a couple other officers were investigating that portion of the aggravated 
assault ... In the 1500 block of Leadville." Id. 
Corporal Grabe testified that the street was partially blocked near the house 
associated with the aggravated assault. Id. at 14. He observed a person outside of the 
investigation potentially interfering with that investigation. Id. at 15. He said he was with 
one of the witnesses and had been watching cars coming down and turn, or go 
otherwards. He observed the appellant's pickup truck approaching and slowly going 
between the sergeant's police interceptor and parked cars, which was going to create a 
problem since this portion of the street was blocked off. 
He described the vehicle as a full-size pickup truck which was coming in and 
going very slow to try and squeeze between the police interceptor and the parked cars. 
Id. He continued: 
My ... first concern was that the truck was gonna hit a police car or the 
parked cars because there was not a Jot of room, I mean inches. And then, 
for the truck to proceed, it was going to be going along where there are 
other parked cars at that point ... And then, my other concern was that 
there wasn't an outlet, and that this truck was going to be going into where 
other officers were - were working . . . it would have been striking an 
unattended vehicle . . . the first vehicle I was concerned about was the 
sergeant's - police interceptor being hit." Id. at 18-19. 
The officer testified the first thing he said to the appellant was "whoa. And then, I 
ran over to the truck and motioned for him to back up." Id. at 19. He said the appellant 
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did not immediately do that. There was a pause, and then the appellant started to back 
up slowly while the officer watched to make sure the vehicle didn't get too close to the 
other parked cars. Id. at 20. 
The officer commanded the appellant to stop and motioned to him to stop. The 
officer shined his flashlight back and forth to get the appellant's attention. Id. He wanted 
the appellant to stop so he could contact him about driving into the investigation and 
trying to drive between a police car that was used as a barrier. Id. The officer had the 
appellant roll down the window to find out why he was driving into the investigation area 
and possibly direct him somewhere else. When the window came down there was an 
odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and the appellant "appeared to be 
not responding as a person would if you were asking them a question or telling them 
something." The officer had a suspicion that the appellant might be intoxicated. Id. at 
21-23. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving 
a trial de nova), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. 
State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of 
law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 
134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
A. Suppression 
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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"When reviewing 'seizure' issues, we defer to the trial court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous. 1 We freely review, de novo, the trial court's legal 
determination of whether or not an illegal seizure occurred." State v. Schwarz, 133 
Idaho 463, 466, 988 P.2d 689, 692 (1999). See also State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 
Idaho 775, 778, 275 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2012): "The standard of review of a suppression 
motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept 
the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Its purpose is to impose a standard of 
reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government agents and 
thereby safeguard the individual's privacy and security against arbitrary 
invasions. An investigative detention is constitutionally permissible when 
based upon reasonable suspicion, derived from specific articulable facts, 
that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime. State 
v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302, 141 P.3d 1166, 1171 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is not the only 
justification for a limited seizure of a person. A detention may also be 
reasonable under the officer's community caretaking function. Regardless of 
which justification is used, the Constitution requires that the intrusive action 
of the police be reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances. Id. 
The community caretaking function arises from the duty of police 
officers to help citizens in need of assistance and is totally divorced from the 
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of 
a criminal statute. Among the core community caretaking activities are the 
responsibilities of police to search for missing persons, mediate disputes, 
aid the ill or injured, and provide emergency services. Id. 
Reasonableness in community caretaking cases is determined by 
balancing the public need and interest furthered by the police conduct 
against the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of the 
'See also State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005) ("The Court accepts the trial 
court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence."). 
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citizen. In order to justify the detention of a citizen, the officer must have a 
genuine and warranted concern rather than simply the officer's curiosity, an 
unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity, or an unwarranted concern 
that help might be needed. The reasonableness of an officer's action in 
pursuit of community caretaking is to be tested upon practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable persons act. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
The appellant asserts the following issues: (1) the Magistrate Court erred in 
binding itself to viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State; and (2) the 
seizure of a driver who is obeying traffic laws and obeys the commands of an officer 
directing traffic may not be seized and subjected to questioning. Appellant's Brief, at 5. 
The Court will set forth the magistrate's ruling in order to provide the full context 
for the statement that the appellant challenges: 
In this case, there's been testimony that this was December 31, 2014, 
approximately 10:00, 10:30 p.m. 
Corporal Grabe took the stand and testified that they - he was there, with 
a number of other officers, investigating what had been phoned in as an 
aggravated assault, and there wasn't really any testimony on whether that 
resulted in an arrest. 
But he did - he did provide a diagram, which has been marked as State's 
Exhibit 2, which indicates there are a number of parked cars on either side 
of - of Leadville, and that he parked his police Explorer diagonally in -
about mid-block there, probably between Highland and Howe, a little 
closer to Highland, according to his diagram ... He parked it in a way to 
prevent other vehicles from getting by or getting into the investigation 
zone. 
The other - he's - he indicated that there were at least three other patrol 
cars, at that time, which had their overhead lights on. He did testify that his 
police Explorer did not have its overhead lights on. And I'm not sure 
exactly where Corporal Grabe was within the - the investigation, but he 
did - he did indicate that he - his attention was diverted when he saw the 
defendant's pickup truck trying to squeeze by the Explorer and between 
some parked cars to get in - into what he considered the investigation 
zone. 
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And I did listen to the audio. The audio he - he - he whistles, he yells 
whoa. And then he goes up and - directs the defendant to - to stop, and 
then to back up, which the defendant does. There's no - there's no 
indication that the defendant struck a vehicle; it's just a matter of he was 
try - attempting to squeeze into a - an area that was - was where there 
was an investigation. 
And the - and the officer did testify that the Explorer was clearly marked 
with big letters on the side, Boise Police; it did not have its overheads on. 
The officer - officer's opinion was that had - had the defendant continued, 
he would have probably scraped or struck a parked car. At that point, he -
he decided to get - he had ordered the defendant to stop, back up; the 
defendant did do that. And then, he - he indicated he needed to talk to the 
defendant and try to find out why he was squeezing into a work area, and 
determine whether he was lost or if there was some sort of problem.2 
And - and the officer did testify that it - would be a bad situation had the 
defendant been able to squeeze into the area. Then he would be into 
a [sic] investigation zone where there were officers on foot, as well as 
officers' patrol cars blocking the other end of the road, and there would be 
no exit. So, he indicated that that was part of his concern was officer 
safety . 
. . . I do think the off - the defendant did comply with the orders and ... I 
think the officer did have a ... duty to ... discuss with the defendant, find 
out what the problem was, why he was trying to get by. And I . . . 
particularly looking at ... Defense Exhibit A, it does look like it would be a 
very, very, very tight squeeze. I'm not saying you wouldn't be able to get 
through, but it would be a real difficult thing to squeeze through ... 
between the Explorer and the parked cars. 
So. taking this - viewing. as I have to. the case in - a light most favorable 
to the State. I think the officer did have - have - have the right. and 
perhaps even the duty. to discuss what ... the defendant was attempting 
to do. 
Had it been a situation where the defendant stopped 15 feet short of the 
whole area and was ordered to stop, I think ... we would have a different 
situation. And I think, in that situation, I'd probably be willing to agree that 
... there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to do anything. 
2
The officer also testified that the defendant was still in the process of attempting to back through the 
parked vehicles when he made contact with him. See n. 4, infra. 
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But in this case, where the defendant did attempt to enter into ... a police 
investigation zone ... and then, even though he was - he was stopped by 
an officer and backed up, I think the officer had - had the right, and the -
probably even the duty, to talk to him, make sure that he understood that 
he can't do that type of thing. 
So, based on that, my conclusion ... I'll deny the Motion to ... Suppress 
at this time. March 16, 2015 Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript, at 64-
68. (Emphasis added.) 
It is unclear what standard the magistrate was relying upon when he said he was 
viewing the evidence presented in a light favorable to the State. The State argues that 
the magistrate's comment meant that he "correctly noted [he] must evaluate the officer's 
judgment and perception of the facts as the officer is observing them at the time." 
Respondent's Brief, at 4. The Court agrees that this is a reasonable interpretation of his 
comment and, as such, would be a correct legal statement. See State v. Horlon, 150 
Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010): 
We examine whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the 
action taken was appropriate." This standard allows room for some mistakes 
on the part of police officers, so long as the mistaken are those of 
reasonable persons. (Citations omitted.) 
"The defendant on appeal is required to show error, and that he was prejudiced 
thereby." State v. Ellis, 99 Idaho 606, 608, 586 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1978). In addition, it is 
well-settled that harmless error is not reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Kappe/le, 158 
Idaho 121, 129, 344 P.3d 901, 909 (2014). See also Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 925, 
877 P.2d 365, 369 (1994): "Harmless error is defined in Rule 52 of the Idaho Criminal 
Rules: 'Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded."' 
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The magistrate's comment constituted harmless error under the circumstances of 
this case. 
1. Stop/Seizure 
The appellant asserts the court should reverse the magistrate's decision on the 
motion to suppress because he was subjected to a warrantless and unreasonable 
seizure. Appellant's Brief, at 6. He contends he was seized in violation of the U.S. and 
Idaho Constitutions when he was ordered to stop and roll down his window after 
obeying the officer's commands to address the perceived risks of his otherwise lawful 
behavior. Id. 
The stop was justified by the fact that the appellant was driving his vehicle past a 
police roadblock into a crime investigation zone. See I.C. § 18-705 ("Resisting and 
Obstructing Officers."). The stop was also justified by the police community caretaking 
function. 
Corporal Grabe testified without contradiction3 that he observed the appellant 
driving his vehicle onto a street blocked due to the police investigation of an aggravated 
assault. According to the officer the appellant was coming very close and could have hit 
vehicles, including police vehicles. He testified that he stopped the appellant because 
he wanted to ascertain why the appellant was driving past a police roadblock into a 
crime investigation scene area. He also said he wanted to inform him about the 
investigation and he wanted to ascertain whether he needed to direct him to where he 
was trying to go. He was also concerned about officer safety and possible property 
3
Thereby minimizing the importance the "light" the evidence was viewed in, particularly since the 
magistrate did not find his testimony to not be credible. 
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damage, resulting from the appellant's driving into and then trying to back away from 
the scene. 
Corporal Grabe's actions were reasonable. The police and community interests 
outweighed the minimal intrusion placed upon the appellant by the police contact. See 
Cutler, supra. See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 
2527,37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); "The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment 
is reasonableness."; United States v. Spooner, 83 Fed.Appx. 626, 628 (5th Cir. 2003); 
"The officer validly entered the vehicle pursuant to a community caretaking function to 
secure and to prevent damage or theft of Spooner's property." (emphasis added); 
Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1478 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1993); "[T]he 
authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or 
threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge." (citing South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)); People v. 
Baskerville, 963 N.E.2d 898, 904, 357 Ill.Dec. 500, 506 (2012); "[T]he defendant's 
intrusion while police were conducting an authorized investigation of a crime scene area 
... provided probable cause to arrest for the offense of obstructing a peace officer." 
(citing People v. Woidtke, 224 III.App.3d 791, 802, 167 Ill.Dec. 486, 587 N.E.2d 1101 
(1992)). See also State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102, 831 P.2d 942, 944 (Ct. App. 1992); 
"A seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on 
the street or other public place and asks a few questions. Even when officers have no 
basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask the individual 
questions and ask to examine identification." Under the circumstances the officer's 
actions were reasonable. 
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• • 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's decision denying the appellant's motion to suppress is affirmed. 
Dated this Z. ,z--day of March 2016. 
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